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On the whole, I think that Katz' second volume of essays on mysticism, is a
success. If there is to be a third, I would suggest that Katz continue to solicit
papers such as those of Gimello and Cousins-papers that really show us, rather
than only tell us, how the mystical literature should be understood.

Creative Interchange, ed. by John A. Broyer and William S. Minor.
Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982.
566 pages. $27.50.
Reviewed by STEPHEN H. PHILLIPS, University of Texas at Austin.
This Festschrift in memory of Henry Nelson Wiemann, 1884-1975, shows
above all Wiemann's influence upon contemporary theology and religious
inquiry. The contributions range in topic from Wiemann's biography through
philosophic and social dimensions of his thought to aesthetics and comparative
religion.
The biographical contributions present Wiemann as a philosophic mystic who
is certain of the reality of "God," and who throughout his life strives to find
concepts adequate to his religious experience. Lewis Hahn's essay emphasizes
the change and development in Wiemann's thought in regard to the content of
his concept of God, as he reflected upon the nature of mystical experience.
Many contributors point out that Wiemann understands the term 'God' to
designate the source of human value. This Wiemann's "formal" definition of
the term apparently derives from his understanding of the relevant intellectual
history. It remains a fixed point in all the theological reformulations.
Marvin Shaw discerns another constant. This is that Wiemann sees mystical
experience not as supernaturalistic, but rather as a special dimension of ordinary
experience which compels personal growth. Often Wiemann identifies personal
growth as the "human good." Gary Kessler stresses that mystical or religious
experience, according to Wiemann, brings a person to transcend inherited dispositions of belief and behavior.
Echoing the vitalism of Bergson and the phenomenology of Husserl, Wiemann
later in his life found "creative interchange" to be the least inadequate way to
conceptualize the source of human good. (That he expresses his views in this
manner, as converging on theoretical adequacy asymptotically, is another indication of Wiemann's empiricism-many contributers see the empiricism as the
most prominent feature of his theology.) Michael Lazarin shows that the precursors of "creative interchange" extend to Plato's concept of eros in the Symposium
as well as to Socratic elenchus.
In enunciating the importance of creative interchange, Wiemann comes to
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speak much less of mystical experience and even of God. Creative interchange
is presumed to be a natural process emerging from the uninterpreted,
phenomenological level of our human being-in-the-world, and in addition something which can be the object of our ultimate commitment.
Everyone of the contributions helps to elucidate this central idea, which gives
the book its title, although many papers, particularly in the sections on aesthetics,
social philosophy, and comparative thought, take Wiemann's ideas as seminal
or explore their significance for one or another individual discipline. The high
quality overall of the thirty-odd papers is a tribute to the power of Wiemann's
thought.
It is difficult to express in a few words what I sense is unacceptable in
Wiemann's central concept, particularly in light of its demonstrated fertility. Yet
Charles Hartshorne, in his essay, appears to pin down the most general difficulty
when he asks (p. 110), "Is that [our being creative], just in itself, a measure of
value?" Wiemann claims that the concept of creative interchange bridges any
presumed gap between fact and value. Creative interchange is also, however,
considered a fact, while Wiemann's conception of it is presumed to be empirically
derived. Hartshorne in his objection reflects longstanding philosophic qualms to
any such approach to the theory of criteria of value.
Yet the interacting of people creatively with one another does appear to spur
progress, at least technological progress, probably other kinds as well, although
one should not underestimate, I should think, the contributions of the recluse.
And perhaps, as John Dewey proposes, we discern the criteria of valuations
through observing what appears to produce things of value while examining our
assumptions concerning it. To an extent, Wiemann's concept may be thought
to generalize from common-sense and finnly held value-assumptions.
However, Wiemann also claims to have discovered the one ultimate value,
and this is bound to raise further objections. Does our creativity itself have value
in the context of the universe as a whole, given the likelihood that our species
eventually will perish? Wiemann does not appear to explain, nor do his defenders
here, how an ultimate value is possible, though he views creative interchange
as just that.
Academic theory of value has become complex and diverse in the last hundred
years. Some follow Brentano and Meinong in endeavoring to fonnulate a unitary
theory. In sharp contrast, the followers of Moore and Wittgenstein attempt to
specify the logic of separate spheres of value. The contributors to this volume
find, generally speaking, Wiemann's thought to preserve the best in these two
apparently conflicting approaches. They tend to see Wiemann's theorizing as at
once unitary and sensitive to distinct value-contexts. But beyond this merit, the
volume leaves the impression that Wiemann's outstanding contribution was his
own personal commitment to value, his own personal response to the history of
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human commitment to values and refinement of valuations, and his effort to
preserve that history in the face of increasing relativism and nihilism.

Ethics: Approaching Moral Decisions, by Arthur F. Holmes. Downers Grove,
Ill: Intervarsity Press, 1984, 132pp., $4.95 (paper).

Reviewed by PETER GENCO, Eastern College.
Christians have always appealed to the Bible when setting themselves the task
of developing a moral theology. However, although they work from a common
source, divergent views still emerge concerning exactly how the Scriptures should
be appropriated in the construction of a systematic Christian ethic. This
methodological concern has prompted some writers to work for a "pure" ethic
.free from the taint of non-biblical approaches and has prompted others to integrate
both philosophical and biblical truth into a unified and more complete whole.
Arthur Holmes takes his place among the latter.
In the first chapter of his book, Ethics: Approaching Moral Decisions, Holmes
expresses the view that there is a complementary link between philosophical
ethics and religion. The former provides the tools for systematically structuring
biblical morality and for addressing questions regarding moral choices and exceptions to moral rules. The latter fleshes out abstract ethical principles and virtues
by drawing on the vast repertoire of ethical material found in the biblical narrative.
Accordingly, Holmes contends, the Christian cannot afford to disregard ethical
reasoning and opt instead for a "pure" biblical ethic. On the contrary, as he sees
it, Christians should want their" ... philosophical and biblical ethics to go hand
in hand, the biblical informing the philosophical whenever possible, and the
philosophical serving the biblical" (p. 13). This means, of course, that Christians
must enter into dialog with other philosophical approaches.
In the next four chapters, Holmes himself enters into dialog with Cultural
Relativism, Emotivism, Ethical Egoism and Utilitarianism. Being faithful to his
purpose, Holmes discloses what is untenable and commends what is acceptable
in each approach. When considering Cultural Relativism, for example, he maintains that Christians must accept as fact the differing moral beliefs and practices
of other cultures and must be tolerant of these differences. However, he also
makes the point that variety does not preclude there being universal moral principles and that tolerance need not be non-selective. In other words, Cultural
Relativism recognizes moral differences (as should the Christian Ethic) but does
not recognize (as does the Christian Ethic) the validity of transcultural principlesand thereby overstates its case. Holmes says the same about Emotivism, Egoism
and Utilitarianism. Each has something to teach the Christian but none tells the

